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An Embodied Bisexual Perspective
Ruth Colker*
INTRODUCTION
In his book, Sex and Reason,' Judge Richard Posner argues that
law and society should treat sexuality as a "morally indifferent
subject."2 Society should regard sexual preferences3 as having no
greater moral significance than preferences for food. Although many
gay rights proponents disagree with Posner's specific application of
this principle,4 no one seems to disagree with his attempt to separate
law and morality.5 That "morally indifferent" perspective which is
* © Ruth Colker, 1995.
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1. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
2. Id. at 181.
3. Posner uses the phrase "sexual preference" rather than sexual orientation but does not
seem to be suggesting that sexual partners are entirely "chosen," since he seems to give credence
to biological explanations of homosexuality. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1. at 105 n.50.
Although he does not explain his decision to use the term "preference" rather than
"orientation," I believe that he uses that term to enhance his analogy to food preferences. He
wants the readers to consider their choices of sexual partners to be a mere preference of little
consequence, rather than a more significant statement about their lives. I use the word
"preference" rather than "orientation" for a very different reason. I want to use that term
because it emphasizes that we can experience a range of relationships with people of the same
or opposite sex-in other words, it acknowledges the possibility of bisexuality. But my use of
the word "preference" is in no way intended to minimize the significance of our choice of sexual
partners. As I will argue in this essay, those choices often make a very significant statement
about our individual identities.
4. Although Posner argues that this perspective would cause us to conclude that we should
eliminate sodomy statutes, he also argues that this perspective would cause us to conclude that
the prohibition against gays in the military, against recognition of homosexual marriages, and
against permitting homosexual couples to adopt children, in some cases, should be retained. Id.
at 309-22, 417-20. Many of these major issues have been addressed by proponents of gay rights,
and they clearly disagree with Posner's application of his basic principle. For a critique of
Posner's application of his perspective, see Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd,
81 GEo. L.J. 2413 (1993).
5. Numerous scathing reviews of Posner's Sex and Reason have been published by feminists.
Yet none of them have attacked his attempt to separate law and morality. See, e.g., Katharine
T. Bartlett, Rumpelstiltskin, 25 CONN. L. REv. 473 (1993) (book review); Ruthann Robson,
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advanced by Posner,6 as well as by many proponents of gay rights,
will be the subject of this essay. I will argue, by contrast, that we
should develop a morally significant perspective on gay rights which
I call an "embodied bisexual perspective." In Part I, I will develop an
embodied bisexual perspective and, in Part II, I will apply that
perspective to sodomy laws, marriage and adoption, and employment
in the military.
I. AN EMBODIED BISEXUAL PERSPECTIVE
An embodied bisexual perspective is that version of morality which
I believe can and should be intertwined with law. A religious feminist
conception of embodiment, upon which I rely, contains two major
principles. First, drawing from a theological tradition, it suggests that
we should promote public discussions of moral issues under the
premise that there is a proper relation between law and morality.
Such a discourse can provide us with a more holistic dialogue, while
also providing us with a more cross-racial dialogue, as the literature
within the civil rights movement is filled with moral and religious
metaphors. Second, the concept of embodiment suggests that we
should try to avoid bipolar discussions of issues, particularly issues
that affect the body. Thus, as I will argue, our highly polarized
gay/straight dichotomy (with no recognition of bisexuality) is
problematic. A bisexual perspective gives us a fuller way to describe
human sexuality while also enhancing cross-racial dialogue since
empirical literature suggests that bisexuality is a more frequent
practice within the African-American community than in other
communities.
A. An Embodied Perspective
An embodied perspective is commonly found in writings by radical
feminist theologians, which have influenced my own understanding of
an embodied perspective. For example, James Nelson has correctly
argued that we should develop a "sexual theology" that combines a
moral perspective with physical experiences of sexuality.7 As Beverly
Harrison has noted, his work attends "to the best feminist insights."'
Posner's Lesbians: Neither Sexy nor Reasonable, 25 CONN. L. REV. 491 (1993) (book review);
Martha A. Fineman, The Hermeneutics of Reason: A Commentary on Sex and Reason, 25 CONN.
L. REV. 503 (1993) (book review).
6. I am not reviewing Posner's book in this essay, since it was recently reviewed in this
journal: See Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Beyond Transgression: Toward a Free Market in Morality,
5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243 (1993).
7. JAMES B. NELSON, EMBODIMENT: AN APPROACH TO SEXUALITY AND CHRISTIAN
THEOLOGY (1978).
8. Id. (comment on book jacket).
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Nelson suggests that a "sexual theology" must recognize the
following ideas: (1) the importance of human sexual relationships; (2)
the existence of sexism within Christian theology; (3) the socially
created aspects of sexuality; (4) the need to learn from, as well as to
understand, people who express their sexuality differently from the
majority; and (5) "the wholeness of embodied selves, the goodness of
sexual pleasure, and the creative significance of sexual self-affirmation
in an incarnational theology."9 In sum, Nelson argues that we "need
to move beyond the traditional confines of 'sexual ethics' into sexual
theology which takes seriously the human sexual experience in our
time and place as an arena for God's continuing self-disclosure at the
same time that it takes seriously the implications of Christian faith for
our sexual lives."'" In other words, Nelson emphasizes the impor-
tance of an interaction between our morality and our physical
experience of sexuality rather than a separation of these two arenas
in our lives. But unlike conservatives who might say that morality
should be used to limit our physical experiences of sexuality, Nelson
considers sexuality to be an experience of self-affirmation that can be
understood on a spiritual level-we rejoice in our sexuality rather
than dismiss it as evil.
Nelson places his sexual theology in a framework that recognizes
the socially created aspects of sexuality, but he does not specifically
tie sexuality to other aspects of social justice. Carter Heyward makes
that connection in her work, which, I believe, gives us a stronger
conception of what constitutes an embodied perspective. She utilizes
a morally based "social justice framework" which "beckons into
solidarity ... all women and other marginalized people."'" Heyward
concludes that in order to achieve social justice, women need to be
able to develop "self-respect." She argues that through such a
framework we can create the "basic conditions for a just and decent
human world."12 I agree with Heyward, and, as I have discussed
elsewhere, would add the aspirations of love and compassion to her
framework of respect.3 Social justice is not possible in a world in
9. Id. at 16. I should note that I read Nelson's use of the word "Christian" quite liberally as
I am not a Christian. I was raised as a Jew and am deeply interested in Eastern philosophy.
Thus, when Nelson refers to the implications of "Christian faith," I translate that to mean the
implications of a deeply aspirational moral vision which may stem from many different moral
and religious traditions. I discuss those traditions more fully in my book, ABORTION &
DIALOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-LIFE, AND AMERICAN LAW (1992).
10. NELSON. supra note 7, at 16.
11. Carter Heyward, Is a Self-Respecting Christian Woman an Oxymoron: Reflections on a
Feminist Spirituality for Justice, 3 RELIGION & INTELL. LIFE 45, 46-47 (1986).
12. Id. at 49.
13. The principles of love, compassion, and respect are not unlimited principles. As I discuss
in ABORTION & DIALOGUE, supra note 9, they are preconditions to dialogue but do not
guarantee the result of the dialogue that might occur. Posner's work, as I will discuss, is based
19951
3
Colker: An Embodied Bisexual Perspective
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1995
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 7: 163
which women are not socialized to respect their value as persons in
our society. Unfortunately, the abusive treatment suffered by women
in the sexual context (e.g., rape and battery) has made it difficult for
women to attain self-respect and respect from others. It is hard to
imagine a world in which men would rape women if men and women
were socialized to respect women's bodily integrity.
As I will discuss below, this kind of "embodied" framework, which
writers such as Nelson and Heyward base in a sexual theology, is very
consistent with the writings of many women of color, irrespective of
whether or not the women of color explicitly ground their work in a
sexual theology. If we would ground issues such as gay rights in such
a sexual theology, I believe that we might then be able to begin to
overcome some of the racial divisiveness in our society and in
feminism. As many of my students have taught me, we cannot expect
to have a progressive politics which is inclusive of African-American,
Hispanic, Asian-American, Native American, and white communities
if we are not willing or able to discuss our politics in moral and
religious terms.14 I will argue that the absence of a genuine holistic
moral dialogue about gay rights has harmed this movement by causing
its public debates largely to be debates among members of the white
community. Proponents of gay rights have made little headway in
creating bridges to women and men of color. This substantial
problem, I believe, can be partially solved through the use of a fully
embodied framework which embraces bisexuality. Thus, the concept
of embodiment has the potential of offering us an additional
contribution-it can help us enter into a more productive cross-racial
dialogue. Nonetheless, as I will discuss, I acknowledge that the
relationship between feminism and theology has often been a strained
one. I simply suggest that such strains are not inevitable.
The writings of many African-American, Hispanic, Asian-American,
and Native American feminists (or "womanists"15 as they sometimes
on such fundamental disrespect for the lives of gay men and lesbians that it does not meet the
preconditions for dialogue.
14. Religion has a great deal of importance to many women in our society. See, e.g., Cheryl
B. Preston, Feminism and Faith: Reflections on the Mormon Heavenly Mother, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 337, 340 n.ll (1993).
15. Alice Walker defines "womanist" as follows:
Womanist encompasses feminist as it is defined in Webster's but also means instinctively
pro-woman. It is not in the dictionary at all. Nonetheless it has a strong root in Black
women's culture. It comes (to me) from the word womanish, a word our mothers used to
describe and attempt to inhibit strong outrageous or outspoken behavior when we were
children: You're acting womanish! A labeling that failed for the most part to keep us from
acting womanish whenever we could that is to say like our mothers themselves and like
other women we admired.
Alice Walker, Coming Apart, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 95, 100
n.* (Laura Lederer ed., 1980)
166
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prefer to be called) are often filled with moral and religious imagery,
and are also critical of a mainstream feminist perspective. These
writings help us to learn how to discuss important issues in ways that
build bridges across religious and racial lines.
Women of color have often felt barred from American feminism
due to its exclusion of racial concerns. For example, African-
American women were asked to forgo their interest in voting as
"blacks" for the sake of the "woman's vote."' 6 In the "second wave"
of feminism, the mainstream movement again excluded women of
color through works such as Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique,
published in 1963. As vividly described by bell hooks, this work was
unconsciously reflective only of the lives of middle- and upper-class
married white women. Friedan argued that women would be more
satisfied with a career, but she ignored those "who would be called in
to take care of the children and maintain the home if more women
... were freed from their house labor and given equal access with
white men to the professions."'" Not surprisingly, such literature
made many African-American women, who often worked full-time in
the homes of middle-class white women, feel ignored and trivialized
by the women's movement.
These feelings of exclusion continued to exist in the 1970s as the
women's liberation movement became a larger force in American
society. For example, Paula Giddings describes one incident that was
reflective of how and why many black women felt alienated from the
women's liberation movement. Members of Third World Women
were carrying signs at a Women's Liberation Day march in 1970 that
criticized Angela Davis's mistreatment by the federal and state
government because of her opposition to the Vietnam War. "[O]ne
of the leaders of NOW ran up to us and said angrily, 'Angela Davis
has nothing to do with the women's liberation.' 'It has nothing to do
with the kind of liberation you're talking about,' retorted [a female
African-American activist], 'but it has everything to do with the kind
of liberation we're talking about."'' 8
Although I will argue that religious feminism can be a source to
draw white and black women together, it can also be a kind of
feminism from which black women feel excluded. For example, in the
path-breaking anthology, This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by
16. See PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACr OF BLACK WOMEN
ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 54-55 (1984).
17. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 1-2 (1984). See also
GIDDINGS, supra note 16, at 299 (providing racial critique of Friedan's work).
18. GIDDINGS. supra note 16, at 305.
1995]
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Radical Women of Color,9 Audre Lorde wrote an open letter to
Mary Daly (a white feminist and theologian), criticizing her for
ignoring the contributions of "our black foremothers"2 in her work
and for failing to discuss any examples from African myth, legend, or
religion in her discussion of the nature of female power in her book,
Gyn/Ecology. "What you excluded from Gyn/Ecology dismissed my
heritage and the heritage of all other non-european women, and
denied the real connections that exist between all of us."'" Lorde
observed that this kind of exclusion serves the forces of racial division
in our society.22 Nonetheless, the anthology is filled with religious
imagery, demonstrating the importance of religion to the feminism of
many women of color.
Despite the alienation that many African-American women have
felt from the mainstream women's movement, there have been many
productive attempts to engage in genuine dialogue. Religion has often
served as the common ground to draw white and black women
together. In 1920, a Methodist minister, Will Alexander, formed the
Council for Interracial Cooperation in Atlanta. 23 This religious
organization provided whites and blacks with a context that em-
phasized their common humanity rather than their stereotypical racial
differences. As one white woman observed, "Whites knew only Black
servants and the criminal in the daily papers ... but the masses of the
best people of my race do not know the best of the Negro race.
24
Unfortunately, this cross-racial interdenominational work has not
been a key feature of the "second wave" of feminism. As noted by
Caroline Ramazanoglu, 2 recent "feminist texts often pay little
attention to religion except to identify particular religions as sources
of patriarchal ideology and practice. '' 2' This exclusion is problematic
because
19. THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie
Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1981).
20. Audre Lorde, An Open Letter to Mary Daly. in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK, supra
note 19, at 94, 94-97.
21. Id. at 95.
22. Id. at 96. Similarly, the importance of religion or spirituality in making women of color
feel included in the women's movement is evident in an anthology of writings by North
American Indian women. See generally A GATHERING OF SPIRIT: A COLLECTION BY NORTH
AMERICAN INDIAN WOMEN (Beth Brant ed., 1988).
23. See GIDDINGS, supra note 16, at 171.
24. Id. at 173. Similarly, bell hooks concludes her book with a statement about the
importance of theological conceptions of love, compassion, and dialogue to our lives. HOOKS,
supra note 17, at 161.
25. CAROLINE RAMAZANOGLU, FEMINISM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF OPPRESSION
(1989).
26. Id. at 151.
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religion can be the dominant factor in the personal identity and
cultural location of millions of women around the world. If
religion is one of the most important and immediate factors
which enables a woman to know who she is, and to give meaning
-" to her life, an international feminist movement cannot afford to
ignore religion."
By saying that more attention to spirituality within feminism might
make women of color feel integrated into the movement, I do not
mean to romanticize mainstream religion. The Black Church, for
example, has itself been a tool for perpetuating sexism within the
African-American community by existing within a male hierarchical
structure.28 Giddings provides many examples of the Black Church's
exclusion of women from the nineteenth century to the 1970s. The
following example ties this exclusion to the dominant role of the
Black Church in the civil rights movement:
One would think that Ella Baker, by virtue of her role in the
creation of SCLC [Southern Christian Leadership Conference],
would have had a decision-making role. Although she says she
did not seek such a position, her observations of the organization
are revealing:
There never would be any role for me in a leadership capacity
with SCLC. Why? First, I'm a woman. Also, I'm not a minister.
And second... I knew that my penchant for speaking honestly
... would not be tolerated. The combination of the basic attitude
of men, and especially ministers, as to what the role of women in
their church setups is-that of taking orders, not providing
leadership-and the ... ego problems involved in having to feel
that here is someone who.., had more information about a lot
of things than they possessed at that time. . .. This would never
have lent itself to my being a leader in the movement there. 9
It is not, of course, only the Black Church that has perpetuated
sexism. Many predominately white Christian churches have also
perpetuated sexism, as well as homophobia, within American society.
For example, at the insistence of the bishop, the United Methodist
Church put Rose May Denman on ecclesiastical trial in 1987 for being
a "self-avowed, practicing homosexual" minister in violation of the
27. Id.
28. Paula Giddings traces the historical routes of patriarchy within the Black Church in the
nineteenth century. See GIDDINGS, supra note 16, at 64.
29. Id. at 312.
1995]
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Book of Discipline, the volume of rules that governs that church.3"
Similarly, the Roman Catholic Church defrocked and eventually
excommunicated Father Bill Dorn after a diocesan newspaper
published an article that was critical of that church's stance on
homosexuality.3 Dr. James S. Tinney, the minister of a black gay
church in Washington, D.C., recalled that his former church per-
formed an exorcism on him when they learned that he was gay. His
former wife told his two daughters that he was demon-possessed and,
until he was on his deathbed, he had no relationship with them.
32
Dr. Howard Brown summarizes the effect that negative Judeo-
Christian attitudes have had on gay and lesbian people. He argues
that it has made the individual homosexual feel
that access to God had been denied him, that all the majestic
rites of church and synagogue celebrated events he could never
hope to participate in, that his union with a lover would never be
blessed, that there would be no priest, preacher, or rabbi to ease
the pain of loss for the surviving partner.33
By contrast, a more progressive attitude toward gay rights by
organized religion can have a positive impact on society. Dr. Brown
recounts that several religious denominations that have begun to take
positive steps such as calling for the repeal of laws discriminating
against homosexuals. In his words, "[t]heir advocacy of an-
tidiscrimination laws undoubtedly carries more weight with legislators
than do the appeals and petitions of small gay groups... . Meeting in
a church allows a whole new set of impulses to come into
play-including the impulse to serve others."'
The fact that religion has been used to exacerbate the oppression
of gay men, lesbians, and bisexual people does not mean that religion
must be dismissed as an inherently negative dimension in their lives.
Although the churches that support gay rights may be few, their
support can be invaluable on many levels; as described by Dr. Brown,
they can add social support while offering a needed moral dimension
to the lives of gay and lesbian people. In addition, as I have argued
above, a complete dismissal of religion as irrelevant to feminism may
30. NEIL MILLER, IN SEARCH OF GAY AMERICA: WOMEN AND MEN IN A TIME OF
CHANGE 211 (1989). Although the jury was compelled to find her "guilty" under Church law,
it awarded her the most lenient punishment-suspension from the Church. Id. at 226. The
parishioners had wanted to be more lenient than the Church authorities. Id.
31. Id. at 228. Three weeks after Father Dorn was removed from his position in late October
1986, the Vatican issued a document stating that homosexual inclinations represented "an
objective disorder." Id.
32. Id. at 247.
33. HOWARD BROWN, FAMILIAR FACES, HIDDEN LIVES: THE STORY OF HOMOSEXUAL
MEN IN AMERICA TODAY 184 (1976).
34. Id. at 185-86.
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contribute to the alienation of people of color from the movement.
The challenge, then, is to find ways to incorporate progressive
religious views into feminism in order to help build cross-cultural
bridges, rather than to dismiss religion entirely.
. Similarly, a dismissal of religion may contribute to the alienation of
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people from feminism, including many
African-Americans who are gay, lesbian, or bisexual. The gay church
(and the gay synagogue) are thriving institutions in our society, simply
because many gay, lesbian, and bisexual people feel a need to be
connected to religion. Not all gay, lesbian, and bisexual people
identify with feminism, although many people, including myself,
believe that feminism can potentially contribute much to the lives of
gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. Neil Miller's In Search of Gay
America devotes an entire chapter to the role of religion in the lives
of gay people. One of his subjects, Isaiah Poole, is an excellent
example of a person for whom religion plays a dominant role. After
being a member of the Unification Church, and then of a mainstream
gay church, Poole became part of a black gay church, Faith Temple.
He underwent baptism and developed a new and fulfilling relationship
with Jesus.35
Similarly, the writings of Mary Daly enabled Rose Mary Denman,
an ordained minister, to find her lesbian identity.36 For Denham, a
person who had always accepted traditional Christian dogma,
including what she understood to be its negative attitude toward
homosexuality, the writings of Mary Daly were essential to Denman's
becoming able to challenge that dogma. Daly's religious feminism
helped her question "all the assumptions that governed her life."37
But for the religious feminism of Mary Daly, Denman might not have
been able to reconcile her life's lesbian and religious aspects. Even
Audre Lorde, who criticizes Mary Daly for being racist, recognizes the
role that Mary Daly has played in helping many women of color
develop a new relationship to Christianity.3" Thus, religious feminism
may very well be essential to reaching members of the lesbian and
gay community. A purely secular feminism may prevent us from
reaching people who are searching for ways to reconcile their gay and
religious selves.
The relationship between religion, feminism, and race is often
strained, yet it remains a possible basis for much productive dialogue.
Religion has contributed to the subordination of many people in our
35. MILLER, supra note 30, at 255.
36. Id. at 218.
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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society, but many of those same people still search for a meaningful
religious basis in their lives. Continuing in that search may not simply
provide us with a renewed meaning to life but may also teach us to
engage in genuine dialogue across our differences of religion, gender,
race, and sexual orientation. Hence, this Article tries to engage in a
holistic discourse that embraces rather than avoids our spiritual selves.
B. A Bisexual Perspective
From the work of Nelson and Heyward, I draw the larger lesson
that we should not only avoid bipolar frameworks in understanding
the relationship between our physical and moral selves, but that, more
generally, we should avoid bipolar frameworks when discussing nearly
all major issues.39 This is the bisexual aspect of my perspective. I
have rarely found a bipolar category that I found useful, although
maybe my dismissal of bipolar categories is, itself, a problematic
bipolar category.
Dody Donnelly, who is a proponent of a "valid mystical feminism,"
draws a similar conclusion from radical feminist theology. She argues
that "dualism stood always in the female path as the chief obstacle to
confidence in her own experience, for both church and society had
taught women (and men) a denigratory view of the body as inferior
to the soul."'  If society could move beyond this false duality,
Donnelly says, women would have greater self-respect and would not
labor under the notion they possess an inferior spirituality.4
Although Donnelly limits her discussion to women's sexuality, I
believe that it equally applies to the sexuality of gay, lesbian, and
bisexual people, who have been told by the mainstream culture that
their sexuality is immoral and inconsistent with deeply held religious
values. Moreover, both Donnelly and Nelson offer frameworks that
validate bisexuality, which has often been denigrated by both the
straight and gay communities, as it represents an outgrowth of the
authors' rejection of bipolarities or dualisms. Instead of considering
humanity to fit into two neat categories-gay or straight-they help
us see the importance of recognizing a continuum of sexuality which
embraces bisexuality.
The central insight from a bisexual perspective is that we should
proceed from the assumption that middle or "bi" categories are useful
descriptions of human nature. Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, a
39. 1 further discuss the implications of what I call a "bi" perspective in BI: Race, Sexual
Orientation, Gender, and Disability, OHIO ST. U. (forthcoming 1995).
40. Dody H. Donnelly. The Sexual Mystic: Embodied Spirituality, in THE FEMINIST MYSTIC
120, 121 (Mary E. Giles ed., 1982).
41. Id. at 125. 140.
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"bi" perspective allows us to see the multiracial backgrounds of many
people whom we simplistically label as "African-American," the many
"bigendered" persons in our society who are forced to conform to the
roles of "male" or "female," and the range of disabilities that people
in our society experience whom we rigidly place in the categories of
"able-bodied" or "disabled. 4 2 This article deals with only one small
part of that impoverished and rigid bipolar system-our bipolar sexual
framework.
An embodied, holistic framework would therefore not be limited by
bipolar understandings of human sexuality and would allow us to
understand and respect each other across religious, gender, and racial
differences. Such an understanding of human sexuality has been
absent from discussions of gay rights by proponents and opponents
alike. Opponents of gay rights have often tried to couch their
arguments in religious views that are both deeply bipolar and
disrespectful of the lives of lesbians, gay men, and bisexual people.
Nevertheless, proponents of gay rights have often seemed hesitant to
make theological arguments on the assumption that religion is always
equated with conservative viewpoints.
A holistic understanding of sexuality could move us beyond the
gay/straight dichotomy and could allow all of us to see ourselves at
different points of experiencing our bisexuality. Nelson takes an
important step in this direction when he writes:
The problem of patriarchal or sexist dualism may be even more
basic to anti-gay feeling. This might be experienced in several
related ways. One is the heterosexual's possible anxiety about
homosexual feelings within the self. While for the sake ofeconomy I have been using "gay" and "heterosexual" .in ways
that might suggest two sharply distinct and mutually-exclusive
groups, current research indicates that people commonly tend
toward some degree of bisexuality. Most, for reasons not yet fully
understood, develop a dominant orientation toward one side or
the other.43
Similarly, Marvin Ellison offers some insights about sexuality and
embodiment that are useful for this discussion. Ellison explains how
the dominant sexual categories of heterosexual and homosexual do
not do justice to the "realities and complexities of our lives.""
Ellison challenges us to live comfortably with change and ambiguity
rather than to rely on fixed categories of sexuality.
42. See generally Colker, BI, supra note 39.
43. NELSON, supra note 7,.at 202.
44. Marvin M. Ellison, Common Decency: A New Christian Sexual Ethics, 50 CHRISTIANITY
& CRISIS 352, 355 (1990).
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Embracing bisexuality can, of course, be very threatening to a
society that orders itself on neat bipolar concepts. What does it mean
to be bisexual? The common stereotype is that one always has one
male and one female sexual partner. This stereotype arises out of the
assumption that gay men, lesbians, and bisexual people are purely
sexual creatures-at all moments being involved with all eligible
sexual partners. Society seems to have trouble imagining a celibate or
monogamous gay, lesbian, or bisexual person.
Bisexuality is simply an accurate way to describe many people's
actual experiences. The terms gay and straight assume a sexual
exclusivity-that a person has always had only sexual partners of the
same or opposite sex. As Betty Fairchild and Nancy Hayward have
noted:
These terms [heterosexual and homosexual, gay and straight] are
convenient simplifications for the idea that most people engage
in sexual relations with only one sex. To get a clear perspective
on the part homosexual behavior plays in the total range of
American sexual experience, we should first take a look at
bisexuality to evaluate its significance in the gay (and straight)
world. There are certainly far more individuals with bisexual
experience than there are lifelong exclusive homosexuals.4"
For women, in particular, bisexuality often seems to be an accurate
description of their feelings of ordinary life experience. In a Ms.
Magazine article from 1976, a large number of women reported "that
when they fell in love it was with a person rather than a gender."
6
My own understanding of bisexuality views the categories of
heterosexual and homosexual as inventions that do a disservice to the
realities of our lives, feelings, and relationships. A story may help
show the uselessness of the traditional labels. A friend called me
recently to talk about getting a teaching job where I teach, the
University of Pittsburgh Law School. I explained a bit about how I
got hired and specifically mentioned that the University had a
commitment to diversity which facilitated my appointment. He then
said, jokingly, "Oh, so they needed a married lesbian." I appreciated
the comment because it accurately reflected the malleability of the
categories that we use so frequently, poking fun at the labels'
mistaken connotations of exclusivity. The term bisexuality may
therefore often be an accurate way to describe the complex ways that
45. BETrY FAIRCHILD & NANCY HAYWARD, Now THAT You KNOW: WHAT EVERY
PARENT SHOULD KNOW ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 75 (1989).
46. Id. at 76.
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people live their lives, not conforming to the rigid bipolar categories
of heterosexual and homosexual.
Gay and lesbian people have been defined by society in a disem-
bodied way so that they have no identity beyond their sexual identity
within mainstream culture-they are gay and lesbian rather than
people. Bisexual people, as I stated earlier, also can be and have been
defined in that way-as irresistibly sexual creatures who always have
at least two partners. Within a fully embodied perspective, people
would refuse to identify with the labels of straight or gay. Instead,
they might say, "I am a bisexual woman who, at present, has no
intimate partner ... or, at present, has a partner who is a woman...
or, at present, has several partners who are men ... or whatever."
Defining one's sexual orientation in such a nonstatic, fluid way would
deeply challenge sexual dualities and the defining of gay, lesbian, and
bisexual people as purely sexual.
Thus far, I have discussed the importance of moving beyond
dualisms to embrace the existence of bisexuality, but I have not tied
that step to a religious discourse. Other authors have made that link.
In a recently published anthology, Bi Any Other Name: Bisexual
People Speak Out,47 the authors include a chapter entitled
"Spirituality: Healing the Splits." The authors argue that "[s]ex
desperately needs to be re-envisioned [in a spiritual context] so we
may reclaim our bodies from the degraded, trivialized way they and
their responses have been represented."48 A bisexual perspective is
therefore an embodied perspective in that it is part of a spiritual
understanding that involves a holistic reclaiming of our selves.
The term "bisexuality" may be particularly useful in understanding
the sexual lives of members of the African-American male com-
munity, although that possibility is rarely discussed or acknowledged.
Although the Kinsey study49 is often cited for statistics about sexual
behavior, it is rarely noted that the study only included white
American men who had engaged in a homosexual act at least once.
50
The statistics that do exist on the sexual behavior of African-
American men are currently inconclusive, but preliminary studies
suggest that African-American men may be somewhat more likely
than white men to engage in both opposite-sex and same-sex sexual
47. Bi ANY OTHER NAME: BISEXUAL PEOPLE SPEAK OUT (Loraine Hutchins & Lani
Kaahumanu eds., 1991).
48. Id. at 91-92.
49. ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948).
50. John L. Peterson, Black Men and Their Same-Sex Desires and Behaviors in GAY
CULTURE IN AMERICA: ESSAYS FROM THE FIELD 147, 148 (Gibert H. Heidt ed., 1992).
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behavior.5' Nonetheless, many of these men who participate in both
heterosexual and homosexual activity continue to identify themselves
as heterosexual.52 A bisexual perspective may therefore be more
racially inclusive in terms of understanding how sexual behavior
actually occurs in the male African-American community.53 The
invisibility of African-American men who engage in sexual behavior
with other men has made it difficult for health care professionals to
spread effectively the "safe sex" message in the African-American
community. By subscribing to a rigid assumption that people who
primarily identify as heterosexual are not engaging in same-sex sexual
behavior, health care professionals have not, until recently, targeted
heterosexual African-American men for safe sex education.
Similarly, the highly bipolar gay rights debate, with its classification
of "gay" and "straight," may make many people within the African-
American and Hispanic communities feel unwelcome. Brenda Marie
Blasingame explains this cultural phenomena:
In talking with older people of color who are queer, I've found
that they often say that in their community people had relation-
ships with people. Some people chose to be involved with both
sexes, whereas others chose to be exclusively involved with same-
sex partners. They spoke of how some people were bisexual.
That was not what it was called, but that was what was taking
place. It was not a subject of conversation: people knew who was
in a relationship with whom, that was how it was and life went
on....
I once talked with a Latino male doing AIDS education in the
Latino community about his approach to educating the com-
munity about safe sex. He said there was no word for bisexual
per se, but that bisexuality existed in the community and that this
had to be addressed in order to teach safe sex. It was very much
like the black community. When they talk about safe sex they
have to refer to it as "when you have sex with another man."
Bisexuality existed in this community.54
51. See id. at 148 (reporting that black men were more likely than white males to engage in
anal intercourse with another man in prison population).
52. See id. at 150. This failure to identify as homosexual or bisexual despite the experience
of same-sex sexual relationships may be reflective of the racism within the white gay movement.
See id. at 152. Sexual identity and racism may therefore be deeply connected. Thus, bisexuality
within the African-American male community might become more evident if the larger society
in which we live were no longer racist.
53. My attention has not been drawn to any discussion of sexual behavior within the female
African-American community. Discussions of "women" generally do not distinguish between
African-American and white women.
54. Brenda M. Blasingame, The Roots of Biphobia: Racism and Internalized Heterosexism,
in CLOSER TO HOME: BISEXUALITY & FEMINISM 47, 51-52 (Elizabeth R. Weise ed., 1992).
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Blasingame's discussion provides excellent insight into the bridges
that must be crossed if people of color are to feel more welcome in
the "gay" movement. Our bipolar orientation about sexuality
therefore contributes to a misleading understanding of how people
actually experience sexuality in their lives while also making people
in various ethnic communities feel separated from the gay rights
movement. When we can start talking about people who have sex
with people of the same sex, without making any assumptions about
whether they also have sex with people of the opposite sex, then we
may enter a more racially inclusive politics.
If it is true that far more people have experienced a bisexual
lifestyle than is commonly recognized, why is bisexuality usually
ignored?55 I would suggest that ignoring bisexuality allows society to
perpetuate the myth that sexuality is rigidly dichotomous. That myth
seems to be a male and white myth to the extent that it especially
hides women's and African-American men's sexual experiences.56
John McNeill argues that this bipolar imagery creates a "narrow,
impoverished, and dehumanizing self-image for both parties.
57
Additionally, the concept of bisexuality may not be given effect
because it might force us to define sexual orientation in a way that is
not tied entirely to ongoing sexual experiences. A person's feelings
rather than choice of sexual partner would be most relevant. This
point arises from the fact that many people identify themselves as
bisexual at times when they are currently involved with both a man
and a woman. They may be involved with, for example, a man but
recognize the possibility (in some cases based on their past ex-
perience) that they could, in the future, be involved with a woman. A
fully embodied understanding of sexuality, of course, understands that
our sexuality is far more than our current sexual experiences. Thus,
I would suggest that it is a disembodied conception of sexuality that
leads society to view sexuality narrowly, noncontextually, and rigidly.
55. Interestingly, homosexuality is also often invisible. Polls consistently report that few
adults in the United States believe that they know any gay or lesbian people. See, e.g., Sylvia
Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 187, 194. I know of
no poll, however, that has even asked people if they know anyone who is bisexual. Poll data also
shows that people who report that they know gay or lesbian people tend to be tolerant of them.
See, e.g., id. The invisibility of bisexuality therefore probably contributes to stereotypical
attitudes but, again, it is hard to prove this assertion since researchers do not appear to ask
questions about bisexuals.
56. A major contributor to that myth was Sigmund Freud. Although he believed that all
humans have a bisexual capacity and that even people who are heterosexual retain homosexual
tendencies, he did not challenge the dichotomous categories of heterosexual and homosexual.
For further discussion, see Law, supra note 55, at 204.
57. JOHN J. McNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 148 (1976).
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Another important consequence of a bisexual perspective that
might promote cross-racial dialogue is a rejection of separatism.
Separatism requires people to identify with one aspect of them-
selves-woman, black, gay, handicapped, and so on. An African-
American lesbian who is a separatist, for example, would have to
separate herself into three distinct categories, none of which would
accord sufficient respect to her humanness. In addition, as we have
seen, separatism in the women's movement has often meant that this
movement has operated only to strengthen the voices of middle- and
upper-class white women, paying little attention to racial and class
issues.
Bell hooks does an excellent job in describing the alienation that
occurs within a "woman's only" feminist movement:
Anti-male sentiments alienated many poor and working class
women, particularly non-white women, from the feminist
movement. Their life experiences had shown them that they have
more in common with men of their race and/or class group than
bourgeois white women. They know the sufferings and hardships
women face in their communities; they also know the sufferings
and hardships men face and they have compassion for them.58
This antiseparatist perspective is related to the role of African-
American women in the church. Hooks, for example, describes the
role of African-American and white women within the cultural groups
in their community. African-American women, she suggests, have
always played a prominent role in the church; white women have had
a more submissive role within cultural organizations. Summarizing
from this cultural difference, hooks says: "Without the material input
of black women, as participants and leaders, many male-dominated
institutions in black communities would cease to exist; this is not the
case in all white communities."59 Asking African-American women
to be separatists is therefore asking them to break their important ties
to the Black Church. This makes no political sense and contributes to
the law/morality dichotomy that I have criticized above.'
58. HOOKS, supra note 17, at 68-69.
59. Id. at 70.
60. Nevertheless, I do not mean to question the need for various subgroups such as African-
American women or lesbians to separate momentarily, in order to establish their own sense of
needs and priorities. Beverly Smith, for example, criticized separatism as a political movement
but nonetheless recognized that "it has some validity in a more limited sphere." See Barbara
Smith & Beverly Smith, Across the Kitchen Table: A Sister-to-Sister Dialogue, in THIS BRIDGE
CALLED MY BACK, supra note 19, at 113, 121. Barbara Smith recognized that it was legitimate
for a lesbian to be a separatist in order to acknowledge "that you really don't need men to
define your identity, your sexuality, to make your life meaningful or simply to have a good time.
That doesn't necessarily mean that you have no comprehension of the oppressions that you
share with men." Id. For an excellent defense of the need for African-American women to
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In sum, the disembodied nature of gay rights discourse remains a
problem both in society as a whole and in the gay rights community.
In society-at-large, the assumption exists that the only legitimate
religious perspective on gay rights must be opposed to gay rights.
Proponents of gay rights have ceded the moral high ground and have
tried to insist that we keep morality separate from politics. A more
holistic view would argue for gay rights from the perspective that gay
people deserve protection from persecution as persons, not because
we should abstractly separate law and politics. Within the gay
community, a holistic perspective would also help us see across our
differences-to recognize the full range of human sexuality that can
be expressed. It would help us move beyond the rigid dichotomies of
gay and straight to recognize the bisexuality in many of us. Moreover,
such a holistic dialogue might cut across racial differences by not
requiring us to identify with rigid categories that conflict with our
cultural experiences.
II. FROM SEXUAL PRACTICE TO SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP: THREE
APPLICATIONS OF AN EMBODIED BISEXUAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Sodomy Laws
In the first part of this Article, I noted that both Richard Posner
and proponents of gay rights have often argued for a separation of
law and morality. As I will discuss below, proponents of gay rights are
correct to criticize the way religious arguments have helped to justify
antigay decisions such as Bowers v. Hardwick,6 1 in which the
Supreme Court upheld a sodomy statute only enforced against
homosexuals. Nevertheless, they are wrong to rely on the disem-
bodied view that religious arguments have no place in deciding issues
like the constitutionality of the Georgia statute at issue in Bowers.
An embodied discussion of the Bowers decision shows us that the
proponents of state sodomy statutes support their views with religious
arguments; their religious arguments, however, are not the only such
arguments available. Opponents of state sodomy statutes often hide
behind the contention that a state cannot codify a religious point of
view. By using this antireligion argument, they avoid discussing the
lives of the individuals who are affected by state sodomy statutes.
Their arguments are disembodied in two senses: they carefully avoid
making any religious or moral arguments, and they do not discuss the
disassociate from white women, see Pamela J. Smith, We Are Not Sisters: African-American
Women and the Freedom to Associate and Disassociate, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1467 (1992).
61. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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wholeness of the lives of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. Rather
than relinquish the moral high ground on sodomy statutes to religious
fundamentalists, I suggest that proponents of gay rights argue that
they have a religious perspective that is constitutionally required to
be respected, not because it is a religious argument, but because it
offers a liberating respect for the lives of all people. In other words,
certain kinds of religious arguments should receive constitutional
protection; the question is how to identify when a religious argument
is constitutionally permissible or even constitutionally required.
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court relied on a distinctly
religious perspective to uphold the criminalization of homosexual
activity. For example, Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion,
provided support for the Court's position through reference to the
fact that "condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-
Christian moral and ethical standards., 62 He summarized this history
by stating that "to hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is
somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside
millennia of moral teaching.
' 63
The dissent in Bowers does not question whether engaging in
homosexual sodomy can be consistent with Judeo-Christian moral and
ethical standards. Instead, the dissent argues that the religious nature
of the majority's perspective demonstrates its constitutional invalidity.
In the words of the dissent:
Thus, far from buttressing his case, petitioner's invocation of
Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical
status during the Middle Ages undermines his suggestion that
§ 16-6-2 represents a legitimate use of secular coercive power. A
State can no more punish private behavior because of religious
intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial
animus. 4
The dissent claimed that it was constitutionally impermissible for
the state of Georgia to codify a point of view that had theological
roots. The problem with the dissent's argument is that whatever
position the state of Georgia takes with respect to sodomy will
conflict with some religious viewpoint on sodomy. The current statute
codifies a religious fundamentalist perspective (among others). Repeal
of the statute would codify a more liberal religious perspective, like
that held by James Nelson and others. The dissent assumes, as does
the larger society, that there is only one religious perspective on
62. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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sodomy-an antisodomy perspective. In fact, the dissent fails to
acknowledge that a variety of complex religious views exist on the
issue of sodomy. It is much too simplistic to say that the state should
not criminalize sodomy because it should not establish a religious
point of view.
Instead, I believe that the proponents of gay rights should argue
that the state may codify what could be seen as a "religious"
perspective on sodomy but not the particular religious perspective
chosen by the state of Georgia. Such an argument does not seem to
be cognizable under the framework proposed by the dissent. The
dissent says:
The assertion that "traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe"
the conduct involved cannot provide an adequate justification for
the statute. That certain, by no means all, religious groups
condemn the behavior at issue gives the States no license to
impose their judgments on the entire citizenry. The legitimacy of
secular legislation depends instead on whether the State can
advance some justification for its law beyond its conformity to
religious doctrine.65
That statement reflects the law/morality distinction at its worst. It
suggests that proponents of gay rights cannot base their perspective
on religious arguments. An author like James Nelson who embeds his
support for gay rights in a spiritual understanding of the beauty of
human sexuality would have to find a secular translation for his
viewpoint. Censoring religious and moral arguments, however, makes
us a less open and compassionate society. What if Martin Luther
King, Jr., could not have argued for civil rights within a religious
framework? What if Dr. King could not be quoted by the courts,
because he represented a religious perspective? Such limitations on
the legitimacy of speech would dull our senses and our humanity, as
well as our liberty.
I suggest that we should not ask whether a viewpoint fits into the
secular or moral-religious camp.6 All discussions about sexuality are
based in morality even when authors such as Posner pretend that they
are not. Instead, we should look closely at whatever viewpoint is
being offered-secular or religious-and ask whether that perspective
conflicts with established constitutional principles. For example, we
might ask whether that viewpoint provides sufficient respect for the
lives and liberty of people in our society. It is the disrespectful aspect
65. 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. I use the words "moral" and "religious" interchangeably because under First
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of a perspective that we should find intolerable, not its religious
content.
Thus, in the context of the Georgia statute, we can show that the
state's perspective is unconstitutional not because it is religious but
because it conflicts with the right of equal protection under the laws.
The state has unconstitutionally failed to respect the very integrity of
the lives of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. The Court has consis-
tently avoided this line of reasoning because it has consistently
avoided acknowledging that homosexuals constitute a "suspect class,"
deserving of heightened scrutiny in traditional equal protection
analysis. The history of discrimination against gay men and lesbians,
however, presents itself as much more constitutionally relevant than
the historical derivation of sodomy laws. Whether those laws happen
to coincide with or derive from religious arguments will not affect the
quality of their impact on the lives of gay and lesbian people; it is that
impact which should be the focus of our attention.
The failure to use an equal protection analysis and thereby inquire
about the lives of gay and lesbian people results in their invisibility,
even in cases which involve basic aspects of their lives. For example,
Michael Hardwick is entirely absent from both the dissent's and the
majority's disembodied discussions in Bowers v. Hardwick. What did
it mean for Michael Hardwick to know that his lifestyle was con-
demned by the state of Georgia and that he was even subject to
prosecution? How is the consensual act of sex itself transformed,
degraded, and manipulated when it is made illegal? How is the basic
self-respect of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people affected by such state
statutes? The dissent's antireligion argument not only fails to persuade
but avoids those difficult questions.
By contrast, the European Court of Human Rights confronted these
issues when it concluded that the Northern Ireland statute which
made it a "crime, punishable with a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment, to commit buggery" violated the European Convention
on Human Rights.67 Unlike the Court in Bowers, the lawyers in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom demonstrated how the challenged statute
had affected the plaintiff's life.' This strategy was successful despite
the fact that, unlike Michael Hardwick, Dudgeon had not spent any
time in jail due to his homosexual activity.
67. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 41 (1980).
68. The court stated that the petitioner "alleged that the prejudice he had personally
suffered included psychological distress, fear of legal repercussions through meeting with other
homosexuals, fear of harassment, blackmail, persecution and resultant disclosure and exposure."
40 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 48.
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As antimiscegenation statutes harmed the self-respect of African-
Americans, antisodomy statutes harm the self-respect of gay men,
lesbians, and bisexual people. The idea of human experience,
however, is absent from our constitutional discourse. In Loving v.
Virginia,69 the antimiscegenation case, the Court used an equal
protection argument to explain why the state's statute (which was
historically justified in religious terms) was unconstitutional. It
adopted an equal protection framework because it understood that
antimiscegenation statutes were rooted in a white supremacist
perspective. These laws degraded the lives of all African-Americans,
regardless of whether an individual African-American cared to marry
a white person. Similarly, sodomy statutes can abstractly be applied
against all members of our society but, as the Court found in Bowers,
they are usually only enforced against people engaging in same-sex
sexual behavior (whom the court categorized as homosexuals). It is
the antihomosexual animus lying behind the application of these
statutes that makes them problematic, not their religious roots.
In his separate opinion in Dudgeon, Justice Polak drew the explicit
connection between sodomy laws and antihomosexual animus using
equal protection principles. He stated that, by "maintaining these
provisions, the State discriminates strongly against this group of the
population in comparison with heterosexual adults who are free to
have any kind of sexual contact in private. This difference amounts to
a clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right in
question.'7°
Dudgeon's highly personal account of his treatment under the law
allowed the majority of the Court of Human Rights to see the way
this statute undermined his right to flourish as a human in our society.
Although this conclusion can be drawn under privacy doctrine, as it
was by a majority of the European Court, it can also be drawn under
an equality-based doctrine, as exemplified by Justice Polak's concur-
ring opinion.
The equality problems with the Georgia sodomy statute, however,
do not limit themselves to an understanding of the statute's an-
tihomosexual bias. The statute in Bowers should also be considered
unconstitutional because of the ways in which it uses gender clas-
sifications in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. A bisexual
perspective can help us understand this problem. Michael Hardwick
was arrested for engaging in oral sex with another man. If his partner
had been a woman, he could have engaged in the same sexual act, but
69. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
70. 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 61-62 (Polak, J., concurring).
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would not have been subject to prosecution. Thus, it was a highly
polarized understanding of both gender and sexual orientation that
drove the state statute. It was only because Hardwick's partner was
not of the "opposite" sex that he was subject to prosecution. A
bisexual perspective would refuse to place significance on the gender
of our partners; instead, it would see us as having sex with people
rather than with stereotyped genders. An Equal Protection Clause
that was truly based in the ideal of equality would protect us in all of
our sexual choices.
Similarly, we may also view the Georgia sodomy statute as part of
a societal message that reinforces gender roles. Although the Georgia
sodomy statute was written in gender-neutral terms, 71 it was
interpreted to apply only to homosexual sodomy. It was therefore a
part of the larger societal scheme that seeks to coerce individuals to
engage in exclusively heterosexual relations, which should ideally be
confined to the institution of marriage. Gay and lesbian people are
therefore denied the opportunity to engage in meaningful sexual
expression. As I will discuss later, rules about sexual activity
combined with rules about who may enter marriage help reinforce a
gendered and patriarchal institution of marriage in our society.72
Thus, the Georgia sodomy statute is unconstitutional because it fails
to respect gay men, lesbians, and bisexual people in an intimate and
expressive aspect of their lives. Moreover, it is wrong because it relies
on an obsessive preoccupation with the gender of our sexual partners.
An embodied bisexual perspective that is rooted in the moral value
of respect for others helps to expose the unconstitutionality of the
Georgia statute. Morality and law must be intertwined to protect our
most basic human freedoms.
B. Marriage and Adoption
In the context of marriage and adoption, Posner abandons his
search for a morally indifferent perspective, believing that law should
retain some restrictions on marriage and adoption for gay and lesbian
people, in order to further certain moral values. Some proponents of
gay rights, in contrast, argue for a separation of law and morality in
dealing with these issues. As I will discuss below, Posner's moral
perspective is not the only one available. An embodied bisexual
perspective could create powerful arguments for recognizing the right
71. The Georgia statute prohibited anal and oral sex. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
72. For further discussion of the connection between gender, sexual orientation, and the
patriarchal institution of marriage, see Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist
Inquiry, 1 LAw & SEXUALITY 9 (1991).
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of gay and lesbian people to attain societal benefits in the area of
marriage and adoption.
Although Posner is willing to separate law and morality in
overturning sodomy statutes, he is not willing to take that step with
respect to homosexual marriage. He offers three distinctions between
sodomy and marriage which, in his view, support the ban on
homosexual marriage. Posner argues that: (1) permitting homosexual
marriage would be widely interpreted as placing a stamp of approval
on homosexuality; (2) broadening the definition of marriage reduces
the information that marriage-related terms convey; and (3)
authorizing homosexual marriage would have many collateral effects
because marriage is a status rich in entitlements.73 Posner's three
arguments are connected to each other, because the externalities
noted by the third argument lead him to conclude in the first
argument that the law should not be morally indifferent to recognizing
homosexual relationships through marriage. Because Posner considers
the costs of recognizing homosexual marriage to be too great, he
suggests an intermediate solution in which the state would allow gay
couples to register their partnership, thereby providing them with
some of the financial benefits (and responsibilities) of marriage.74
The two key differences between Posner's proposed intermediate
solution and a solution that recognizes homosexual marriage are that:
(1) the intermediate solution does not purport to take a moral
position on gay marriage; and (2) the intermediate solution offers gay
couples fewer family-related benefits and less recognition than the
current law offers to married heterosexuals. For example, Posner
notes, but does not criticize, the Danish law of registered partnership,
which places registered partners under all the provisions of the
marriage code except those relating to children.75 He also notes with
approval that the Swedish system of registration "assumes, realistical-
ly, I think, that a homosexual relationship, even when meant to last,
is more like heterosexual cohabitation than like heterosexual
marriage."76
Posner's proposed intermediate solution gives us insight into the
disembodied nature of his reasoning. He refuses to acknowledge the
importance of the state recognizing homosexual relationships in a way
that would contribute to their legitimacy and consequently their
flourishing on the broadest possible level. Instead, he constructs a
solution under the premises that children are not and should not be
73. POSNER, supra note 1, at 312-13.
74. Id. at 313-14.
75. Id. at 313.
76. Id. at 314.
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a major aspect of a homosexual relationship, and that homosexual
relationships are inherently unstable and lack long-term commitment.
He then ascribes a moral position to the state which would reinforce
those premises rather than undermine them. His proposal therefore
combines law and morality in a way that deeply disrespects the search
for commitment within gay, lesbian, and bisexual relationships.
Posner's moral perspective on gay marriage is exactly the kind of
position that causes proponents of gay marriage to argue that law and
morality should be separated in determining whether or not gay men
and lesbians have the right to marry. Proponents of gay rights, such
as Nan Hunter, often argue that marriage should be transformed from
a religious institution into a purely secular institution.77 Hunter's
entirely secular discussion of the importance of marriage misses its
emotional and spiritual elements. She discusses the increased
recognition of gay and lesbian families by the law for functional
purposes such as rent control. She urges the courts to continue in this
functional direction while also giving gay and lesbian people the
option of embracing the institution of marriage.78 However, the gains
that she cites for gay and lesbian people under marriage seem to be
largely economic. Her argument is in many ways consistent with
Posner's argument for an intermediate solution-they are both
seeking ways to extend greater economic benefits to gay and lesbian
people without requiring the state to take the moral perspective that
their relationships deserve the label of marriage.
An embodied bisexual perspective, however, could provide us with
a way of discussing gay marriage that would not be dependent on the
separation of law and morality, a way that, unlike Posner's, respects
the fundamental dignity of gay, lesbian, and bisexual couples. For
example, Dwight Penas has attempted to discuss why gay and lesbian
people should be permitted to participate fully in the institution of
marriage by using Puritan religious ideology.79 In order to
understand why prohibiting gay and lesbian marriage is inappropriate,
he argues that one must recognize the full implications of the
covenant of marriage. Penas's theologically based argument for the
recognition of gay and lesbian marriage goes far beyond the economic
benefits flowing from marriage. He argues that "the denial of legal
recognition for same-sex marriages takes a toll beyond the economic
and legal costs." s We must recognize the "intertwined legal and
77. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 72, at 13.
78. See id. at 19-27.
79. Dwight J. Penas, Bless the Tie That Binds: A Puritan-Covenant Case for Same-Sex
Marriage, 8 LAW & INEQ. J. 533 (1990).
80. Id. at 550.
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emotional burdens that [partners] must bear as a result of the lack of
legal sanction for their relationship."81 Penas urges that we apply
"covenant theory" to affirm the importance of personal relationships.
"The fundamental premise of covenant theory is that human life is
communal, interpersonal, social."'
A covenantal perspective would suggest that it is not enough for
society to accept, one step at a time, the right of gay and lesbian
couples to share in the benefits of a rent-controlled apartment,83
obtain alimony after a separation,84 or to receive certain governmen-
tal benefits under ordinances passed at the local level. These marginal
economic benefits may fool society into thinking that it has granted
gay and lesbian people all the "rights" they need while failing to
recognize the spiritual, emotional, and covenantal aspects of their
relationship, which are often best described by the term "marriage."
Penas argues that this covenantal aspect of marriage can best be
located within an equality-based legal tradition.' Thus, gay and
lesbian couples will never have the full respect of society unless they
can partake in the symbolic, as well as the functional, aspects of
marriage. The functional benefits are certainly important, but they are
not sufficient to accord gay and lesbian people the social support and
validation of the emotional bond of marriage.
The marriage issue is deeply intertwined with the question of
adoption, which Posner explores and concludes should not be
modified to benefit homosexual parents. The adoption issue receives
implicit recognition by Posner during his marriage discussion when he
notes that Denmark did not extend to registered gay couples the right
to children that it provides to heterosexual partners. But Posner does
not even consider that exclusion worthy of discussion, although later
in his book he does explain that gay and lesbian couples should not
be granted the right to adopt children on the same basis as
heterosexual couples.'
Posner agrees with court decisions that have limited the custody or
adoption rights of gay men or lesbians where those individuals wanted
to "flaunt" their sexual orientation by openly making their children
81. Id.
82. Id. at 554 (quoting DOUGLAS STURM, COMMUNITY AND ALIENATION: ESSAYS ON
PROCESS THOUGHT AND PUBLIC LIFE 61 (1988)).
83. See Brisk v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (treating gay couple as family for
purposes of provision in New York rent control law that protected surviving "members of the
family" from eviction in event of death of named tenant).
84. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (recognizing implied contract for support
of unmarried partner).
85. Penas, supra note 79, at 561.
86. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 419.
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a part of their lifestyle.' He criticizes a father who wanted to take
his eleven-year-old son to homosexual social gatherings and to a gay
church, and criticizes both that father and a lesbian for wanting to
teach their children that a gay or lesbian lifestyle was desirable.'
Interestingly, Posner contends that gays and lesbians are not as happy
as heterosexuals,89 but then criticizes gays and lesbians when they
want to communicate their contentment with their lifestyles to their
children.
Posner's discussion of custody and adoption for gay couples
contains two major flaws. First, his argument uses as its premise the
moral perspective that gay parents should communicate a message of
inadequacy rather than equality to their children. Second, his
argument is entirely devoid of any understanding of the importance
of children to the general flourishing of relationships, including those
of gay and lesbian couples. Not surprisingly, he therefore does not
explore the effect of current adoption laws on the lives of gay and
lesbian couples. His argument is therefore disembodied: he adopts a
moral perspective that is deeply disrespectful of the lives and liberties
of gay men and lesbians, and that is not based on an understanding
of the full lives of gay men and lesbians.
Posner has done the empirical research that would allow him to
appreciate the significance that being able to adopt children might
have for homosexual couples. For example, Posner says that
"[c]hildren are the strongest cement of marriage and the emotional,
if no longer the financial support, of old age."'  And because
homosexual couples cannot have children who are biologically their
own, and must adopt or have a child from one of the couple's gene
pools, he concludes that homosexual relationships are inherently less
stable.9 Noting that people in the "average homosexual marriage
would have fewer children than the average heterosexual mar-
riage,"" he concludes that homosexual marriages are less stable than
heterosexual ones.
Despite Posner's propensity for empirical research, he does not
offer any evidence for his claim that the more children a couple has,
the less likely they are to get divorced. It certainly would not be
surprising to learn that couples with large numbers of children
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. For example, Posner says: "I conclude that even in a tolerant society the life prospects
of a homosexual-not in every case, but on average-are, especially for the male homosexual,
grimmer than those of an otherwise identical heterosexual .... " Id. at 307.
90. Id. at 305-06.
91. Id. at 304.
92. Id. at 305.
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experience more marital strain than couples with only few or no
children. But aside from the subjectivity of his correlation between
the number of children and the strength of a marriage, Posner's
conclusions are very troubling because of the way he glibly assumes
that couples would feel less committed to children who are adopted
or who are only a product of one of their gene pools. Adoption,
artificial insemination, surrogacy, and custody are all methods that
may be used by gay and lesbian couples to become (or to stay)
parents. Each of those methods involve strong intentionality; gay and
lesbian couples, in particular, do not become parents through
adoption without going to great lengths to find a child. Posner's
inability to comprehend how such steps might be meaningful to gay
couples and might reflect an extremely committed relationship shows
the limited understanding he has of the nature of these relationships.
Children are not just the "cement" that makes it cumbersome to end
a married relationship; they can become the essential meaning of
one's life as a parent and as a part of a couple. Children, however,
only seem to serve functional purposes in Posner's analysis-holding
marriages together or providing support in old age-rather than
serving emotional, social, and spiritual purposes. Those purposes can
be, and are, readily fulfilled even if a child is not the product of the
biological union of a couple.
Posner's analysis of the relationship between children and stable
relationships is also flawed by his apparent assumption that children
born to heterosexual couples are always wanted and intended.
Unplanned pregnancies have been identified as a major factor in
studies of divorce rates.93 Although the birth of children who are
intended and wanted may strengthen a marriage, the birth of children
who are unintended may of course hurt a marriage. One advantage,
therefore, of gay and lesbian relationships is that the likelihood of
unintended pregnancies is remote.' Thus, children do not necessarily
need to be "cement." Their effect on a relationship depends, in large
part, on whether they were intended and wanted. Posner's simplistic
understanding of the role that children play in relationships may be
convenient to his argument but has little connection to reality.
As with the issue of marriage, Posner tries to find a middle ground
that would allow gay men or lesbians to adopt children in special
circumstances. After noting the widespread and unscientific intuition
93. See, e.g., MARILYN LITTLE, FAMILY BREAKUP 36 (1982) (reporting that 44 percent of
children born to families who divorced were unplanned).
94. As one author has noted, lesbians often make conscious choices to become parents. "It
is often a carefully orchestrated undertaking, with focussed attention to the personal, social,
psychological, ethical and practical considerations." Cheri A. Pies, Lesbians and the Choice to
Parent. 14 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 137, 139 (1990).
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that gay men and lesbians are not fit parents, he says that "it is
undesirable to have a flat rule against permitting homosexuals to have
custody of children or even to adopt them."'95 For example, he
acknowledges that a gay man or a lesbian might be a suitable parent
if he or she is the biological parent and the other biological parent is
not a fit parent, or when a child has repeatedly been in foster care
arrangements and the gay man or lesbian might offer a stable family
life.' In other words, he is willing to allow gay men or lesbians to be
legal parents when a child is in a particularly difficult or troubled
situation, but is not necessarily willing to let gay men and lesbians
compete with heterosexuals for "normal" children who are available
for adoption. This view insults gay men and lesbians, as well as
children in difficult situations. If gay men and lesbians can be fit
parents under the most trying situations, then they can be fit parents
in other contexts as well. Current laws that allow gay men and
lesbians to adopt "hard-to-adopt" children take advantage of the
strong desire of, and limited opportunities for, gay men and lesbians
to adopt children. Posner's view also insults hard-to-adopt children
who deserve society's first-priority concern. To cast them off to a
group that society does not generally consider to be fit parents seems
counterintuitive. We should be able to tell a child that we have tried
to give him or her the best possible parents, not that we have given
him or her parents who were considered too inadequate to parent
other children. If Posner truly considered the intentionality and
commitment of gay men and lesbians to childrearing when they do
seek to obtain children, I believe he would see a commitment to
children that deserves the full embrace of our society and its legal
system.
In sum, Posner's limited understanding of marriage and adoption
does not allow him to see the ways in which society could contribute
to the flourishing of the relationships of gay and lesbian people while
also contributing to the well-being of children. A fully embodied
perspective on marriage would see the emotional, spiritual, and
psychological aspects of gay and lesbian relationships rather than
simply the functional ones. Our spouses would then be more than
"partners," and our children would be more than "cement."
C Gays in the Military
The final area that I feel merits discussion involves gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals in the United States military. The courts, as well as
95. POSNER, supra note 1, at 418.
96. Id. at 419.
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Posner, have historically used a moral perspective to uphold the
exclusion of gays from the military. As with marriage and adoption,
this moral perspective is based on a disembodied rather than
embodied understanding of sexuality.
Posner believes that the exclusion of gays from the military can be
upheld by reference to the argument that "the morale of
heterosexuals, and hence the effectiveness of the military services,
would suffer if homosexuals were allowed to serve."' He further
justifies this conclusion by noting that about 70 percent of Americans
believe that homosexuality is dirty, deviant, or abnormal.98 Because
of the external effect of a loss in morale among heterosexual troops,
he allows a moral perspective to dictate our legal perspective. As with
the issues discussed above, however, he does search for a middle
ground, suggesting that we adopt Canada's approach and, without
relaxing the bar against recruitment of homosexuals, permit them to
remain once accepted into military service, provided they do not
engage in the sorts of misconduct that would get them discharged if
they were heterosexuals. 9 In other words, if homosexuals are willing
to hide their sexual orientation, they may be able to stay in the
military. This approach is similar to the "don't ask, don't tell" policy
proposed by the Clinton Administration.
Posner's middle ground might work if being "out" as a gay person
in the military were only a linguistic matter once service began. Gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals, however, do not seek to be "out" in the
military just because they want to feel free to talk about their
personal lives. They want to be "out" so that they can integrate their
personal lives into their military lives by having the same privileges
as married heterosexuals to call home, to have their families live on-
base, and to receive certain family allowances. As General
Schwarzkopf frequently noted in his autobiography,1" family
support services are very important to people who work in the
military. Gay men and lesbians also have families who need those
support services. Current military policies, as well as Posner's
proposed middle ground, are unlikely to recognize gay men and
lesbians in the totality of their lives.
The impoverished and disembodied understanding of sexual
orientation that undergirds the military's policy against gays in the
military can be best seen with the Clinton policy. Gays are allowed to
be in the military so long as their sexual orientation only concerns
97. Id. at 316.
98. Id. at 318.
99. Id. at 321.
100. H. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF, IT DOESN'T TAKE A HERO 262 (1992).
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private, sexual acts, but does not concern public statements about love
and commitment. A soldier stationed overseas cannot ask for
privileges to call "home" if he or she is unmarried, but he or she can
engage in private sexual behavior off-base with a person who is
unlikely to be a lifetime partner. In other words, under the new
policy, only the nonrelational aspects of sexual orientation are
protected; the relational aspects may not be sustained through the
normal public channels-communication or even publicly displayed
photographs-because these steps would be too blatant. The strain of
separation from family is not acknowledged as part of the lives of gay
and lesbian people in the military. Only a sexuality of economics,
rather than a sexuality of spiritual morality, would arrive at such a
result.
The case law with respect to the exclusion of gays from the military
also has a very limited understanding of what it means to be "out" as
a gay man or lesbian in the military. Much of the case law seems to
assume that being gay is only about sex. For example, in ben-shalom
v. Marsh,'° the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
discharge of a lesbian from the military despite the fact that there was
no evidence in the record of her ever having engaged in any lesbian
sexual activity. The court justified her discharge apparently by
assuming that lesbians are always engaged in sexual activity.'0
2
In other words, the court defined the meaning of ben-shalom's
sexual orientation as a statement about whom she planned to have
sex with tomorrow. This represents a narrow, impoverished understan-
ding of sexuality because it starts from the rigid assumption that our
sexual orientation concerns only sex. I would hope that our sexual
orientation is a statement about whom we love and with whom we
feel strong emotional bonds, not simply about our sexual partners. It
is only when we develop a holistic understanding of the statement "I
am a lesbian" that we can begin to develop military policy based on
respect for the lives of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to discuss a highly divisive is-
sue-discrimination on the basis of sexual preference-within an
embodied bisexual perspective. I have tried to show that, if we paid
more attention to the religiously based writings of women of color, we
would be able to develop a more holistic understanding of this issue
that would be embedded in a social justice framework. That
101. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
102. POSNER. supra note 1, at 464.
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framework would allow us to move across religious, gender, and racial
differences as we discuss sexual preference in a moral framework
based on respect for others. It would give us a way to explain that our
choice of sexual partners has and should have more moral significance
than our choice of chocolate over vanilla.
I have tried to show that there is no morally indifferent perspective
on sexual preference. A morality of economics may make our society
more efficient, but it does not justify a social structure of hatred,
antagonism, and disrespect toward the lives of gay, lesbian, and
bisexual people. The problem with an ostensibly morally indifferent
framework is its inherent morality. And the flaw in Posner's oc-
casional "morally informed" perspective is its immoral lack of respect
for the dignity of individual lives. By unmasking that morality and
exposing that lack of respect, I have tried to suggest an alternative
morality that would contribute to our flourishing as sexual beings in
our society.
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